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<h1 id="encrypted-rooms-password-protected-channels">Encrypted Rooms (Password-Protected Channels)</h1>
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<p>An <strong>encrypted room</strong> is a channel whose entire content — every message and every file — is
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end-to-end encrypted with a key derived from a shared passphrase. Only people who know the
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passphrase can read the room. <strong>Not even the server owner can read the content</strong>, yet the server
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can still gate who joins, and it can count and measure what's stored (message count, file sizes,
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timestamps) without ever seeing the plaintext.</p>
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<p>This is a stronger guarantee than the <a href="encryption.html">transport and at-rest encryption</a> described
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elsewhere, where the server decrypts every message to process it. Here the server is treated as
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<em>untrusted</em> for content: it holds only ciphertext and wrapped keys.</p>
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<blockquote>
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<p><strong>The passphrase is the only key.</strong> There is no recovery. If everyone who knows a room's
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passphrase forgets it, that room's history is permanently unreadable — by design.</p>
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</blockquote>
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<h2 id="what-the-server-can-and-cannot-see">What the server can and cannot see</h2>
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<table>
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<thead>
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<tr>
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<th>The server <strong>can</strong> see</th>
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<th>The server <strong>cannot</strong> see</th>
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</tr>
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</thead>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>That the channel is encrypted</td>
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<td>Message text</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Message count and timestamps</td>
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<td>File contents</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Who sent each message (sender identity)</td>
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<td>Image previews (ASCII art)</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Each attachment's <strong>file name</strong> and byte size</td>
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<td>The passphrase, the room key, or the key-encryption key</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>The estimated total size (via <code>/meta</code>)</td>
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<td>Anything that would let it decrypt the above</td>
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</tr>
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</tbody>
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</table>
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<p>File <strong>names are stored in plaintext</strong> so the file list stays usable — treat a file name itself as
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non-secret. Everything <em>inside</em> the file is encrypted.</p>
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<h2 id="key-hierarchy">Key hierarchy</h2>
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<p>Three keys are derived from one passphrase. The passphrase, the key-encryption key, and the room
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content key <strong>never leave the client</strong>.</p>
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<pre><code class="lang-mermaid">flowchart TD
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P[Passphrase] -->|PBKDF2-SHA256, 210k iterations, per-room salt| OKM[64-byte output]
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OKM --> AK["Auth key (first 32 bytes)"]
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OKM --> KEK["Key-encryption key / KEK (last 32 bytes)"]
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AK -->|sent as lowercase hex| SRV1["Server: BCrypt-hash as the join gate"]
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RCK["Room Content Key (random 256-bit)"] -->|encrypts all content| CONTENT[Messages + files + previews]
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RCK -->|AES-256-GCM wrap under KEK| WRAP["Wrapped room key"]
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WRAP -->|stored| SRV2["Server: stores wrapped key + salt only"]
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</code></pre>
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<ul>
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<li><strong>Auth key</strong> — the join credential. Derived from the passphrase, sent to the server as hex, and
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stored only as a <strong>BCrypt hash</strong>. Proving knowledge of it is what lets you join; it reveals
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nothing about the content key.</li>
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<li><strong>Key-encryption key (KEK)</strong> — never sent. Used locally to <em>wrap</em> (encrypt) and <em>unwrap</em> the room
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content key.</li>
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<li><strong>Room Content Key (RCK)</strong> — a random 256-bit key generated once, at room creation. It encrypts
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every message and file. The server stores it only in wrapped form, so it can hand the wrapped key
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to a joiner but can never unwrap it itself.</li>
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</ul>
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<p>All content encryption is <strong>AES-256-GCM</strong> with a random 12-byte nonce and a 16-byte authentication
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tag per item, so identical inputs never produce identical ciphertext, and any tampering is detected.</p>
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<p>Room-encrypted text carries a self-describing prefix so clients and the server can tell it apart
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from plaintext:</p>
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<pre><code class="lang-text">$RC1$base64(nonce || tag || ciphertext)
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</code></pre>
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<h2 id="creating-a-room">Creating a room</h2>
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<p>The client does all the cryptography locally, then hands the server only what it needs to gate joins
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and store (but not read) the content.</p>
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<pre><code class="lang-mermaid">sequenceDiagram
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participant Client
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participant Server
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Client->>Client: generate salt + random Room Content Key (RCK)
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Client->>Client: DeriveKeys(passphrase, salt) → auth key + KEK
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Client->>Client: wrap RCK under KEK
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Client->>Server: create channel { authKey(hex), salt, wrappedRoomKey }
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Server->>Server: BCrypt-hash auth key, store salt + wrapped key
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Note over Server: Server never receives passphrase, KEK, or RCK
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</code></pre>
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<h2 id="joining-a-room">Joining a room</h2>
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<pre><code class="lang-mermaid">sequenceDiagram
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participant Client
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participant Server
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Client->>Server: GET /crypto → { isEncrypted, salt }
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Client->>Client: DeriveKeys(passphrase, salt) → auth key + KEK
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Client->>Server: join { authKey(hex) }
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Server->>Server: BCrypt-verify against stored hash
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alt correct passphrase
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Server->>Client: history (ciphertext) + wrapped room key
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Client->>Client: unwrap RCK with KEK, then decrypt everything locally
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else wrong passphrase
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Server->>Client: rejected (join gate fails)
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end
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</code></pre>
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<p>A wrong passphrase fails the BCrypt gate, so the server never even hands out the wrapped key. Even if
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it did, an attacker without the KEK cannot unwrap it.</p>
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<h2 id="what-gets-encrypted">What gets encrypted</h2>
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<p>When you send a message or attach files to an encrypted room, the client encrypts each part with the
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room content key <strong>before</strong> uploading:</p>
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<ul>
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<li><strong>Message text</strong> → <code>$RC1$…</code> ciphertext.</li>
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<li><strong>Files</strong> (any kind) → the whole blob is AES-256-GCM encrypted client-side; the server stores an
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opaque ciphertext blob.</li>
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<li><strong>Image ASCII previews</strong> → rendered on the client, then room-encrypted. The server never sees the
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rendered art.</li>
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</ul>
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<p>The server records each attachment's <strong>kind</strong>, <strong>file name</strong>, and <strong>byte size</strong> (of the ciphertext
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blob) as metadata, and broadcasts the ciphertext to other members, who decrypt locally.</p>
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<h2 id="changing-the-passphrase">Changing the passphrase</h2>
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<p><code>/passwd <old> <new></code> rotates the passphrase. Because only the <em>wrapping</em> of the room content key
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changes — not the RCK itself — <strong>all existing history stays readable</strong>:</p>
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<ol>
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<li>The client proves knowledge of the old passphrase (old auth key).</li>
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<li>It unwraps the RCK with the old KEK, then re-wraps it under the new KEK (new salt).</li>
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<li>It uploads the new auth key + salt + re-wrapped key. The content is never re-encrypted.</li>
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</ol>
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<h2 id="inspecting-a-room">Inspecting a room</h2>
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<p>Use <code>/meta</code> in any channel to see what the server knows about it, including encrypted rooms:</p>
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<pre><code class="lang-text">Room info for #private-room:
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Room ID 3f2a…-…-…
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Created 7/16/2026 2:31 PM
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Messages 128
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Unique users 4
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Est. size 42.5 MB
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Protection end-to-end encrypted
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</code></pre>
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<p><code>Est. size</code> is the sum of stored attachment blob sizes plus message text length — an estimate of the
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room's footprint, computed entirely from metadata the server holds without reading any content.</p>
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<h2 id="limitations--security-notes">Limitations & security notes</h2>
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<ul>
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<li><strong>No recovery.</strong> A lost passphrase means unrecoverable history. Keep it safe; there is no reset.</li>
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<li><strong>File names are plaintext.</strong> They stay readable so the file list works — don't put secrets in a
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file name.</li>
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<li><strong>IRC is disabled for encrypted rooms.</strong> The IRC gateway forwards plaintext and cannot participate
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in the room's key scheme, so encrypted channels are not bridged to IRC.</li>
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<li><strong>Metadata is visible.</strong> Message counts, timestamps, sender identities, file names, and sizes are
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intentionally readable so the server can moderate at the metadata level and report <code>/meta</code>.</li>
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<li><strong>Endpoint trust.</strong> End-to-end encryption protects content from the server and the network, not
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from a compromised client device that already holds the passphrase.</li>
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</ul>
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<h2 id="related">Related</h2>
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<ul>
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<li><a href="encryption.html">Message Encryption</a> — transport (<code>$ENC$v1$</code>) and optional at-rest database
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encryption, where the server <em>does</em> decrypt content for processing. Encrypted rooms are a separate,
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stronger layer that sits on top.</li>
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</ul>
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